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Examining linkages among multiple sustainable development outcomes is key for understanding 25 
sustainability transitions. Yet rigorous evidence on multiple social and environmental outcomes of 
sustainable development policies remains scarce. We conduct a national-level analysis of Brazil’s 
flagship social protection program, Zero Hunger, which aims to alleviate food insecurity and poverty. 
Using data from rural municipalities across Brazil and quasi-experimental causal inference techniques, 
to control for non-random treatment allocation, we assess relationships between investment and 30 
outcomes related to inter-linked sustainable development goals (SDGs): ‘no poverty’ (SDG 1), ‘zero 
hunger’ (SDG 2) and ‘health and well-being’ (SDG 3). We also assess potential perverse outcomes 
arising from agricultural development adversely impacting ‘climate action’ (SDG 13) and ‘life on land’ 
(SDG 15) via clearance of natural vegetation. Despite increasing daily per capita protein and kilocalorie 
production, summed ZH investment did not alleviate child malnutrition or infant mortality, and 35 
negligibly influenced multi-dimensional poverty. Effects on natural vegetation loss varied; higher 
investment increased cover in some biomes but increased losses in the Cerrado and especially the 
Pampa. Effects varied substantially across sub-programs. Conditional cash-transfer (Bolsa Familia) was 
mainly associated with non-beneficial impacts, but increased protein production and improved 
educational participation in some states. The agricultural-supportive PRONAF was typically associated 40 
with increased food production (protein and calories), multi-dimensional poverty alleviation and 
changes in natural vegetation. Our results inform policy development by highlighting successful 
elements of Brazil’s Zero Hunger program, variable outcomes across divergent food security 
dimensions, and synergies and trade-offs between multiple sustainable development goals, including 
environmental protection. 45 




Meeting sustainable development goals (SDGs) requires assessing trade-offs and synergies across 50 
divergent goals and robust policy impact evaluation. Using quasi-experimental inference methods, we 
assess impacts of Brazil’s Zero Hunger (ZH) social protection programs. ZH investment increased per 
capita calorie and protein production. Social impacts (multi-dimensional poverty, child malnutrition 
and infant mortality) were more limited and the direction of change in natural vegetation cover was 
biome specific. Conditional cash transfer (Bolsa Familia) generated fewer benefits and more trade-offs 55 
than agricultural support (PRONAF). Results inform policy development, including roll out of ZH 
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inspired programs in sub-Saharan Africa. We highlight successful elements of social protection 





Introduction. Sustainability is an elusive societal goal requiring transitions across multiple dimensions 
- including food security, poverty alleviation, health and environmental protection (1). These major 
global challenges are interrelated (2), and are reflected in national and international development 
agendas, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (3).  
 Food insecurity (SDG 2) remains an intractable global problem (4). Addressing it requires 65 
meeting multiple objectives simultaneously: enough healthy and nutritionally diverse food needs to be 
produced and available at all times to a population with physical and economic access to it (5). Food 
security is directly linked to poverty alleviation (SDG 1), and health and well-being (SDG 3) (6). 
However, agricultural production is also a key driver of natural vegetation and biodiversity loss 
(conflicting with SDG 15), and greenhouse gas emissions (conflicting with SDG 13) (7, 8).  70 
Understanding synergies and trade-offs among multiple sustainability objectives, and how they 
are influenced by policy interventions has been a key focus of scholarly and policy discussions around 
the globe (9). Despite recent methodological advances in causal impact estimation empirical research 
which quantifies synergies and trade-offs among diverse social and environmental outcomes from 
poverty alleviation programs is still extremely rare (10). There is a marked and urgent need for such 75 
studies to ensure that the impacts of development programs across the range of intended and unintended 
sustainable development outcomes are quantified and considered when formulating policy. We address 
this gap by assessing how Brazil’s flagship Zero Hunger (ZH) social protection programs have affected 
food production, multi-dimensional poverty, child malnutrition and infant mortality, and changes in 
natural vegetation cover. National development strategies frequently implement social protection 80 
programs to support livelihoods, alleviate income or food poverty, and manage vulnerability to shocks 
(11). Programs are often designed and evaluated as single instruments. A crucial part of any program 
evaluation is assessing whether program objectives are met, but programs rarely asses secondary 
outcomes that are not core objectives (12). This restricted focus increases the risk that trade-offs and 
perverse outcomes remain undetected, potentially generating incomplete conclusions on program 85 
effectiveness (13).  
In our assessment of ZH’s social protection programs, we leverage a suite of high spatial 
resolution datasets, and use a quasi-experimental approach that combines covariate balancing weights 
with multiple regression analyses to help control for potential non-random program implementation. 
Our analysis provides novel insights on how to achieve multiple sustainability outcomes, and is directly 90 
relevant to the design and implementation of social protection mechanisms in other regions of the world, 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa, where several programs are partly based on ZH (14). 
 
Brazil’s Zero Hunger Program. The ZH program aimed to lift 44 million poor Brazilians out of 
poverty and food insecurity and was fully implemented in 2004 (15). Four sub-programs formed the 95 
core of ZH, and at its inception received ~90% of ZH’s total budget (15). ZH has since evolved into 
other initiatives (Brasil Sem Miseria, i.e. Brazil without extreme poverty) that continue to operate these 
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four sub-programs with national government funding allocated to state or municipal governments, and 
in some instances directly to program beneficiaries. Small-scale family farmers are the programs’ 
primary target beneficiaries, due to their key role in rural development and national food security (16, 100 
17). They are provided with i) low interest agricultural credits through The National Program to 
Strengthen Family Farming (PRONAF) and, ii) access to price-controlled markets through The Food 
Acquisition Program (PAA). The markets created through PAA are operated by state-linked institutions 
that buy produce directly from local farmers to supply social assistance programs, government funded 
schools and local markets (15). A key social assistance program is iii) The National School Feeding 105 
Program (PNAE) which provides free school meals to all children  and promotes the use of produce 
from family farms (15). Finally, families in poverty, many of which are small-scale farmers, qualify for 
monthly cash transfers through iv) The Bolsa Familia (BF) sub-program, conditional on child school 
attendance and participation in family health checks and vaccination programs (although families 
without children can also get support) (15). ZH and core sub-programs predate the SDGs, and do not 110 
combine objectives focused on protecting the natural environment or climate change mitigation with its 
objectives concerning food production and poverty. Nevertheless, these programs form an integrated 
large-scale initiative with the potential to influence both social and environmental dimensions captured 
in the SDGs framework, including rural livelihoods and food security, health outcomes, agricultural 
production, and land-use change. Assessing ZH and its contribution to multiple outcomes – both 115 
intended (food security, poverty and health) and unintended (environmental) – is thus vital to get a full 
understanding of its contribution to transitions towards sustainability (10). 
ZH programs have been associated with increased farm incomes and productivity (18–20), 
increases in agrobiodiversity (21), increased food purchases in food insecure households (22), reduced 
child malnutrition (23, 24), and lower infant mortality (25, 26). Yet, contrasting evidence suggests that 120 
ZH programs have had negligible effects on agricultural production, farmer livelihoods, child 
malnutrition and long-term food security (27–30), and have failed to reach the poorest and most 
vulnerable families (31–33). However, the majority of ZH impact studies assess impacts on individual 
treated and untreated households. They thus focus exclusively on micro-scale pathways that generate 
benefits, ignoring the larger scale indirect pathways through which benefits can accrue (e.g. impacts of 125 
market stimulation on untreated households (34)). Assessing aggregate impacts over larger geographic 
scales enables us to: first - capture potential impacts arising from investment in ZH at the cost of reduced 
investment in other initiatives (e.g. basic infrastructure (35)); and second - account for impacts of 
expansion of agricultural activities beyond the boundaries of household land parcels. Previous studies 
are also limited by a failure to consider spatial heterogeneities, and/or key confounding factors, and 130 
have focused on a narrow range of outcomes that prevent full exploration of synergies and trade-offs 




Analytical approach. We assess ZH effects on food production, multi-dimensional poverty, health and 
changes in natural vegetation cover using a quasi-experimental approach and municipal level publicly 135 
available data from national and global sources (see Materials and Methods). We created a high-spatial 
resolution longitudinal dataset for rural municipalities across Brazil (n = 3786-4976, i.e. 74-97% of all 
rural municipalities – sample sizes were outcome and program component dependent). We focus on 
rural areas because this is where family farmers (one of ZH’s primary beneficiaries) are overwhelmingly 
concentrated, and because impacts are likely to be heterogeneous across urban and rural areas. We first 140 
analyse the impact of summed financial investment across ZH’s main sub-programs (PRONAF, PAA, 
PNAE and BF), and then separately assess the impacts of the two largest sub-programs, BF and 
PRONAF, which captured respectively 46% and 42% of ZH’s summed investment between 2004 and 
2013. These sub-programs are examples of the types of social protection programs that are frequently 
implemented elsewhere: conditional cash transfer to protect minimum subsistence (BF), and credit 145 
provision to support household investment and livelihood diversification (PRONAF) (11).  
We assess impact on changes in multi-dimensional poverty (SDG 1), food production (daily 
per capita Kcalorie and protein production; SDG 2), child malnutrition (proportion of underweight 
infants and children age 12-24 months; SDGs 2 & 3), infant mortality (children <1 year; (SDGs 2 & 3) 
and area (km2) under natural vegetation cover (SDGs 13 & 15). For all outcomes we measure change 150 
from 2004 (the first complete year of ZH implementation) to 2013 (at the time of analysis the most 
recent year with information across all predictor variables). We use two separate datasets for multi-
dimensional poverty and infant mortality that represent i) the poorest sub-sample of each municipality’s 
population using data from the national primary information system (SIAB) (change assessed 2004-
2013) (36), and ii) the entire municipal population using the national demographic census (due to census 155 
dates assessing change from 2000 to 2010). 
We combine covariate balancing generalized propensity score weights (CBGPS method (37)) 
with multiple regression analyses to assess links between investment and changes in outcomes. This 
helps limit potential non-random treatment allocation bias by reducing the correlation between 
treatment and potential confounding factors (37) (Materials and Methods and “SI Appendix; CBGPS”). 160 
We model outcomes in the final year of the evaluation period as a function of summed per capita 
investment in ZH (R$). We account for inflation (IGP-DI index, base year 2013), and control for 15 
key biophysical and socio-economic factors and baseline conditions, including variables that affect the 
implementation of ZH and its sub-programs (Materials and Methods and “SI Appendix; Confounding 
variables; Table S1 and Table S2”).  165 
Our statistical regression models include interactions between investment, and state or biome 
to account for potential spatial variation in program implementation, and differential outcomes in 
divergent environments. We use our regression models to predict changes in outcomes resulting from 
three different investment scenarios: negligible investment (defined as the 1st percentile of investment 
values to avoid using zero values that would predict beyond the data range), actual investment, and a 170 
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spatially uniform investment (defined as the median investment value). We map predicted percentage 
change in outcomes per municipality (arising from actual and spatially uniform investment) relative to 
a negligible investment scenario to visualize impacts across Brazil. We conduct several robustness tests 
to assess if our inferences still apply when excluding lower quality data - defined as municipalities with: 
i) extremely large areas (>10,000 km2) that are likely to have less representative socio-economic data 175 
(38), ii) SIAB data that do not meet quality criteria defined by the Ministry of Health (39), or iii) natural 
vegetation data that cover less than 95% of the municipality’s area due to cloud cover in 2004 or 2013. 
Controlling for data quality in our natural vegetation robustness models leads to the exclusion of 77% 
and 99.7% of the Amazon and Pantanal biomes’ area. We therefore exclude these biomes from our 
robustness tests. We focus on results from models that use all data when these are qualitatively similar 180 
to those from models that exclude lower quality data, and in the few cases where discrepancies arise 
focus on results from the latter. We also check, and confirm, that our results are not unduly influenced 
by spatial autocorrelation or endogeneity (Materials and Methods and “SI Appendix; Robustness 
tests”). 
 185 
Results. We find considerable heterogeneity in the effects of ZH investment. This variation arises for 
three primary reasons. First, impacts are outcome specific with evidence of positive, negligible and 
negative effects. Second, within a single outcome, impacts depended on whether investment is delivered 
via conditional cash transfers (BF) or agricultural credits (PRONAF). Finally, within a single outcome 
variable and investment mechanism, there is often considerable spatial variation in the magnitude and 190 
direction of effects (Fig. 1). This is often not simply due to spatial variation in investment levels (Fig. 
S1), as marked spatial variation in outcomes frequently remains when modelling outcomes using a 
spatially uniform investment level (Fig. S2).  
 
Food production. Summed investment across ZH sub-programs increased protein production across 195 
Brazil, while investment increased Kcalorie production in three states (Rondonia in the north, Sergipe 
in the north-east, and Sao Paulo in the south-east) and reduced in two (Acre in the north and Paraiba in 
the north-east) (Table 1; Fig. 1). Substantial spatial variation in outcomes is partially driven by differing 
investment levels (Fig. S1), as regional variation is reduced when keeping investment levels spatially 
uniform (Fig. 1 and Fig. S2), as well as trade-offs between Kcalorie and protein production arising 200 
primarily from BF investment. 
Across most of Brazil, PRONAF investment was associated with increased protein (mean 
predicted change per municipality = 41.0%, S.E. = 0.9 compared to the negligible investment scenario; 
mean increase = 597.0 grams per capita per day, S.E. = 25.7) and Kcalorie production (mean predicted 
change per municipality = 32.8%, S.E. = 0.9; mean increase = 37,668 Kcalories per capita per day, S.E. 205 
= 2,601). Although when excluding lower quality data investment only generated a significant increase 
in Kcalorie production in three states (Rondonia in the north, Bahia in the north-east and Sao Paulo in 
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the south-east) and investment significantly reduced production in four states (Acre and Para in the 
north, Paraiaba in the north-east and Espirito Santo in the south-east). While percentage increases in 
production are more marked in southern Brazil (Fig. 1), this is linked to higher investment levels in this 210 
region (Fig. S1): using spatially uniform investments levels PRONAF increases protein and Kcalorie 
production in the north-east at a similar rate to the south, albeit from a lower base (Fig. S2). This is 
notable as the north-east region has difficult climatic (hot and dry) and socio-economic conditions, and 
low productivity of family farms (40, 41). While family farmers in southern Brazil have participated 
more actively in larger national and international markets (42), e.g. for soybean, rice and beef (43), 215 
family farmers in the north-east are generally poorer (42) but contribute greatly to local and national 
production of staple foods such as rice, maize and cassava (40). Diverting some PRONAF funds from 
the south to the north-east could thus deliver cost-effective national improvements in local food 
production targeted at regions with the greatest need, and address a key critique that PRONAF favours 
wealthier farmers producing commodity products in the south (32). 220 
BF also increased protein production (mean predicted change per municipality = 168.1%, S.E. 
= 8.8 per municipality; mean increase = 282.9 grams per capita per day, S.E. = 20.0). Rates of increase 
appear to be greater in north-eastern states (e.g. Alagoas), where baseline production was low (Fig. 1) 
and food insecurity has been historically high (16). BF impacts probably arise because conditional cash 
transfer increase incomes in poor agricultural households by up to 46% (44). These can either facilitate 225 
investment in agricultural production (as observed for cash-transfer programs in Mexico (45)) or 
stimulate food markets and increase local production due to increased purchasing power.  
Despite positive BF effects on protein production, we find no overall effect of BF on Kcalorie 
production. We find, however, four states with BF-linked reductions in Kcalorie production (Amapa in 
the north, Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte in the north-east and Goias in the centre-west), and two states 230 
with BF-linked Kcalorie increases (Acre in the north and Rio Grande do Sul in the south; Fig 1). These 
spatial patterns persist when modelling impacts using spatially uniform investments (Fig. S2). One 
reason why BF investment may not have increased Kcalorie production may be that some farmers have 
used BF investment to switch from production of staple crops to protein production. To explore this 
potential mechanism we assess rice and cassava production (which are the main high Kcalorie crops), 235 
and milk and poultry production (which are the main high-protein products generated by Brazilian small 
scale farmers and used for local human consumption (16, 46).  We find that total rice and cassava 
production have declined by 45% in the north-east, 65% in the centre-west, and 30% in the south-east. 
We also find that total milk and poultry production increased in the north-east (milk = 26%; poultry = 
14%), centre-west (milk = 19%; poultry = 17%) and south-east (milk = 15%; poultry = 38%). Use of 240 
cash transfers to purchase rather than produce food is another potential mechanism for the declines in 
crop production (29, 30), especially when falling food prices (due to increases in agricultural 
productivity, primarily by large-scale agro-businesses) increase purchasing power of money received 
through cash transfers especially for low income populations (47), while simultaneously reducing the 
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profitability of small scale production of staple crops. Regardless of the mechanism, BF does not seem 245 
to increase local production of stable crops, and at worse it may reduce it, which could reduce food 
security resilience to any future price shocks (2).  
 
Multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI). We analyse two multi-dimensional poverty measures 
capturing information on living standards, health, and education. Our first measure uses data from the 250 
poorest sub-sample of the population (SIAB), while the second captures the municipality’s entire 
population (census). SIAB derived multi-dimensional poverty is not associated with summed ZH 
investment across sub-programs, and effects of PRONAF investment are also negligible (Fig. 1, Table 
S3). BF investment is associated with increased SIAB derived multi-dimensional poverty (Table 1; 
mean predicted change per municipality = 80.7%, S.E. = 0.5; mean increase = 0.026 MPI, S.E. = 255 
0.0003), however, when lower quality data are excluded a significant increase in SIAB derived multi-
dimensional poverty only remains in two states (Mato Grosso and Sao Paulo).  
It is clear that BF has had limited capacity to alleviate multi-dimensional poverty and in some 
regions is associated with increased poverty – these findings are counter to expectations (25, 48), but 
our robustness tests strongly suggest that they do not arise due to hidden bias generated by unmeasured 260 
confounding factors (“SI Appendix; Robustness tests”). Indeed, previous studies suggest that until 
2010, BF support did not reach 1.2 million eligible families, and those that did receive support obtained 
insufficient funds to lift them out of poverty (44). Moreover, our results are compatible with a sub-
national case study showing that BF was associated with increased child malnutrition, which is part of 
our SIAB derived multi-dimensional poverty measure (27). Notably, BF support is conditional on child 265 
school attendance, and we do find that BF investment is associated with improvements in the 
educational dimension of our SIAB derived multi-dimensional poverty measure in two states (Parana 
and Santa Catarina: Table S4). These positive impacts, whilst more limited, match those of previous 
research (49), and suggests that conditional cash transfers dependent on participation in education can 
support the educational targets of SDG 4.  270 
There is little evidence that summed investment across ZH sub-programs is associated with 
notable improvements in our census derived multi-dimensional poverty metric. Whilst, when lower 
quality data are excluded ZH investment is significantly associated with a multi-dimensional poverty 
reduction, the overall effect is very small (mean predicted change = 1.9%, S.E. = 0.2 per municipality; 
mean reduction = 0.002 MPI, S.E. = 0.0001). When all data are included in the models there is an 275 
approximate balance in the number of states with investment associated reductions in multi-dimensional 
poverty (5 states: Acre and Amazonas in the north, Ceara and Rio Grande do Norte in the north-east, 
and Rio de Janeiro in the south-east) and poverty increases (4 states: Para in the north, Bahia in the 
north-east, and Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo in south-east; Fig. 1). 
BF investment is generally associated with increases in census derived multi-dimensional 280 
poverty (mean predicted change = 34.7%, S.E. = 0.9 per municipality; mean increase = 0.013 MPI, S.E. 
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= 0.0002 per municipality) and only one state exhibiting significant poverty alleviation in response to 
BF investment in both the core and robust model (Fig 1 and “SI Appendix; Robustness tests”).  BF 
investment, however, is linked to significant improvements in the educational dimension of our census 
derived multi-dimensional poverty measure in some states (Para and Rondonia in the north, and Alagoas 285 
and Bahia in the north-east: Table S4).  
Our results suggest that the effectiveness of BF on multi-dimensional aspects of poverty, other 
than educational benefits in some states, are constrained across much of Brazil. There are numerous 
possible mechanisms for this. First, supply-side constraints may play a role, especially insufficient 
access to health services (50), and a lack of monitoring of the health and nutritional status of beneficiary 290 
families (e.g. between 2005 and 2012, 3.2 million BF households remained unmonitored (51)). Notably 
these constraints have been reported to be less marked in north-eastern Brazil (52), which is where we 
find some evidence that BF alleviates (census derived) multi-dimensional poverty. Second, the 
increased taxation that is required to fund BF is disproportionately allocated to the poorer sectors of 
society, thus increasing fiscal poverty amongst some BF participants (53) that reduces their capacity to 295 
purchase assets that contribute to our measure of multi-dimensional poverty. Finally, insufficient access 
to labour markets or longer-term financial security, e.g. through pensions, may also limit BF’s ability 
to reduce multi-dimensional poverty (44).  
In contrast to BF, we find that PRONAF investment was associated with an overall reduction 
in our census derived multi-dimensional poverty measure (Table 1; mean predicted change per 300 
municipality = 9.7%, S.E. = 0.2; mean reduction = 0.006 MPI, S.E. = 0.0001). The largest reductions, 
measured in terms of percentage change, occur in southern Brazil (22.2%, S.E. = 0.3) (Fig. 1). This is 
not due to higher investment as this spatial pattern remains under a uniform investment scenario (Fig. 
S2), and is probably influenced by the lower census derived multi-dimensional poverty baselines in this 
region (Fig. 1), which increase rates of change expressed as percentages. 305 
PRONAF funds must be invested in agricultural production. This investment could lead to 
increases in farm employment opportunities, or stimulate labour markets associated with the production 
and sale of agricultural materials and equipment. Wealthier and more competitive farmers tend to be 
better placed than poorer farmers to benefit from any stimulation of labour markets (54), which might 
help explain the observed contrasting effects between PRONAF associated improvements in census 310 
derived multi-dimensional poverty, and the negligible effects in the SIAB derived multi-dimensional 
poverty measure.  
 
Infant mortality and child malnutrition. The only detected effect of ZH investment on infant mortality 
is that BF investment is associated with increased SIAB derived infant mortality (mean predicted 315 
change = 59.4%, S.E. = 0.4 per municipality; mean increase = 725.4 deaths per 100,000 live births, S.E. 
= 5.9 per municipality; Table 1). These effects were not detectable, however, when we exclude lower 
quality data (Table S3). Increased child malnutrition, for which data are only available from the poorest 
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sub-sample (SIAB), is also associated with social security (BF) investment (mean predicted change = 
67.7%, S.E. = 0.4 per municipality; mean increase = 103.4 underweight children per 10,000 weighed 320 
children, S.E. = 1.2 per municipality; Table 1).  
In combination our results provide strong evidence that investment in ZH programs is not 
alleviating SIAB derived child malnutrition, or census or SIAB derived infant mortality. Our findings 
extend earlier work conducted at local scales (27, 29, 50) to the national scale, though studies with 
beneficial associations between BF and child health also exist (25, 26). The lack of improvements in 325 
response to BF investment are compatible with, and may partly be driven by, higher multi-dimensional 
poverty levels and reduced per capita calorie production from staple crops, which we also find are 
associated with higher BF investment. Lack of improvements from BF investment may also be linked 
to insufficient monitoring and resultant intervention of the health and nutritional status of beneficiary 
families (see above), perhaps due to diversion of funding away from municipal institutions in charge of 330 
monitoring (55) or investments in basic infrastructure (e.g. education, health centres and public 
sanitation systems) (35, 56). Such infrastructure is still insufficient in many rural areas (57) and 
particularly amongst BF recipients (58), but is important for BF and conditional cash transfers to be 
effective (59). Similarly, the lack of beneficial impacts on child malnutrition and infant mortality arising 
from PRONAF investment occur despite PRONAF delivering substantial improvements in per capita 335 
food production.  
This is unlikely a result of food unavailability due to export away from local markets since the 
share of family farm produce exported abroad is minimal (0.04% of temporary crops and 0.07% of 
permanent crops in 2006 (60)) and again probably arises due to poor access to health services and basic 
infrastructure for this sector of society, and perhaps limited participation in PRONAF amongst poorer 340 
and more vulnerable farmers (32).  
 
Natural vegetation cover. Summed investment across ZH sub-programs is associated with increased 
natural vegetation cover in the Amazon (per municipality mean predicted change = 0.9%, S.E. = 0.01; 
mean predicted increase = 53.9 km2, S.E. = 5.0; summed predicted increase = 24,434 km2 across 454 345 
municipalities), Atlantic forest (per municipality mean predicted change = 2.4%, S.E. = 0.02; mean 
predicted increase = 2.5 km2, S.E. = 0.1; summed predicted increase = 5,826 km2 across 2,337 
municipalities) and Caatinga (per municipality mean predicted change =  0.6%, S.E. = 0.003; mean 
predicted increase = 2.9 km2, S.E. = 0.1; summed predicted increase = 2,210 km2 across 772 
municipalities, Caatinga predictions are from the model excluding lower quality data due to a change 350 
in the direction of effect compared to a model that uses all data irrespective of quality (Table 1; Table 
S3; Fig. 1). In contrast, summed ZH investment is associated with natural vegetation loss in the Cerrado 
(per municipality mean predicted change = 2.8%, S.E. = 0.04; mean loss = 30.9 km2, S.E. = 1.6; summed 
predicted loss = 30,844 km2 across 1,020 municipalities) and Pampa (per municipality mean predicted 
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change = 19.9%, S.E. = 0.8; mean loss = 122.6 km2, S.E. = 13.9; summed predicted loss = 11,155 km2 355 
across 92 municipalities).  
The direction of the effect of PRONAF investment on natural vegetation cover was the same 
as impacts of summed investment (ZH) in all biomes except in the Amazon where PRONAF investment 
was associated with deforestation (mean predicted change = 1.6%, S.E. = 0.03 per municipality; mean 
decrease = 96.3 km2, S.E. = 9.6 per municipality; summed predicted decrease = 42,863 km2 across 454 360 
municipalities). PRONAF investment was associated with natural vegetation gains in the Atlantic forest 
(per municipality mean predicted change = 9.7%, S.E. = 0.1; mean increase = 9.7 km2, S.E. = 0.3; 
summed predicted increase = 22,316 km2 across 2,337 municipalities) and Caatinga (per municipality 
mean predicted change = 1.2%, S.E. = 0.01; mean increase = 5.5 km2, S.E. = 0.2; summed predicted 
increase = 5,594 km2 across 1,015 municipalities).  In contrast, PRONAF investment was associated 365 
with natural vegetation losses in the Cerrado (per municipality mean predicted change = 3.0%, S.E. = 
0.03; mean loss = 30.8 km2, S.E. = 1.6; summed predicted loss = 31,030 km2 across 1,020 
municipalities) and Pampa (per municipality mean predicted change = 23.9, S.E. = 0.6; mean loss = 
158.5 km2, S.E. = 17.3; summed predicted loss = 14,427 km2 across 92 municipalities). When the model 
excludes lower quality data (which means also excluding all of the Amazon and Pantanal biome) 370 
PRONAF loses its overall significant effect. The effect of investment in the Caatinga and Cerrado also 
become non-significant and is reduced to less than a one percent average predicted change, however, 
the significant gains of natural vegetation in the Atlantic Forest remains. 
 BF is associated with natural vegetation loss in four biomes: the Amazon (per municipality 
mean predicted change = 2.5%, S.E. = 0.02; mean loss = 181.9 km2, S.E. = 18.3; summed predicted 375 
loss = 82,597 km2 across 454 municipalities), the Cerrado (per municipality mean predicted change = 
3.9%, S.E. = 0.04; mean loss = 45.0 km2, S.E. = 2.3; summed predicted loss = 45,851 km2 across 1,020 
municipalities), Atlantic forest (per municipality mean predicted change = 0.9%, S.E. = 0.01; mean 
predicted loss = 1.2 km2, S.E. = 0.04; summed predicted loss = 2,660 km2 across 2,337 municipalities) 
and Pampa (per municipality mean predicted change = 42.3%, S.E. = 0.6; mean loss = 377.2 km2, S.E. 380 
= 41.2; summed predicted loss = 34,704 km2 across 92 municipalities). In contrast, BF investment is 
associated with increased natural vegetation in the Caatinga (per municipality mean predicted change 
= 0.5%, S.E. = 0.001; mean predicted increase = 2.3 km2, S.E. = 0.1; summed predicted increase = 
1,743 km2 across 772 municipalities, Caatinga predictions are from the model excluding lower quality 
data due to a change in the direction of effect compared to a model that uses all data irrespective of 385 
quality Table 1; Table S3; Fig. 1). Consequently, the contrast between negative impacts of PRONAF 
and BF on natural vegetation in the Amazon and apparent positive impacts of summed ZH investment 
suggest that the more minor ZH sub-programs (i.e. PNAE and PAA) may drive positive forest 
transitions in the Amazon.  
Our analyses focus on total change rather than fine scale spatial dynamics of loss and gain but 390 
clearly indicate that social protection programs can have divergent, and biome specific impacts on 
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natural vegetation in biomes that support a number of endemic and globally threatened species. The 
Cerrado and Pampa biomes consistently lost natural vegetation as investment in summed ZH, PRONAF 
and BF increased, with proportional losses being particularly large in the Pampa. This conflicts with 
goals to maintain biodiversity (SDG 15, life on land). In other cases, investment was associated with 395 
increased natural vegetation cover, most notably PRONAF investment was associated with increased 
Atlantic Forest vegetation – this and other changes in woody vegetation cover will influence carbon 
storage and sequestration (61) and thus action to tackle climate change (SDG 13). Investment in the 
heavily degraded and fragmented Atlantic Forest might have promoted agricultural intensification, 
limiting agricultural expansion and enabling vegetation regrowth on more marginal lands. Investments 400 
in the Pampa and Cerrado, however, could have promoted agricultural expansion. Indeed, spatially 
explicit analyses across Brazil suggest that positive forest transitions in the Atlantic Forest are 
associated with agricultural intensification, whilst agricultural expansion has led to forest loss in the 
Cerrado (62). The greatest ZH associated losses of natural vegetation occur in the Pampa in which the 
flat terrain could have facilitated expansion of arable systems (soy and sugar-cane) outside the flood-405 
plain, as this is more profitable than the low-density livestock system that dominate the region (63), and 
driven the loss of natural grassland  – although expansion of livestock has also contributed to these 
losses (64). The expansion of arable crops is likely to be driven by demand from international 
commodity markets, which tend to drive land conversion as a result of improvements in production and 
profitability (2). Such agricultural expansion is likely to generate other losses of natural vegetation 410 
associated with investment in ZH, including PRONAF driven deforestation in the Amazon and BF-led 
vegetation losses across most of Brazil (i.e. all biomes except the Caatinga). Notably cash-transfer 
programs focusing on poverty alleviation have been linked to deforestation elsewhere in the Neotropics 
because they promote the consumption of products that require large areas of land for their production 
(65). 415 
 
Discussion and policy recommendations. Our analysis of ZH’s social protection programs reveals 
synergies and trade-offs across outcomes and program components. We show that increases in food 
production (linked to the food availability aspect of food security - SDG 2) do not lead to improvements 
in other food security and health measures (child malnutrition and infant mortality - SDGs 2 & 3). 420 
Multi-dimensional poverty reductions (SDG 1), when present, are modest especially for the poorer 
sectors of society. ZH’s social protection programs have also had substantial effects on natural 
vegetation cover (SDGs 13 &15). Notably, the direction of these impacts vary across biomes, which is 
probably linked to regional differences in the capacity for investment to limit agricultural expansion 
and associated forest transitions. It is clear, however, when considering all outcomes that positive 425 
synergies (win-win outcomes) across divergent sustainable development goals arose more rarely than 
trade-offs (win-lose) and negative synergies (lose-lose) as a consequence of investment in social 
protection programs (Table 1; see Fig. 2 for examples). Notably positive synergies can arise across 
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paired outcomes relating to human well-being and environmental protection (Fig. 2). This is of notable 
policy relevance as environmental outcomes of social protection programs are much less well 430 
understood than their impacts on people (13).  
Several factors could have increased the probability that benefits of social protection programs 
are either limited or trade-off against additional sustainable development objectives. Access to ZH’s 
social security programs in Brazil has not been conditional on environmental compliance – this contrasts 
with the Brazilian Central Bank’s policy (Resolution 3,545) where rural credit conditioned on proof of 435 
environmental land registration has reduced deforestation rates in the Amazon (66). Environmental 
conditionalities imposed on social protection programs that encourage retention of natural vegetation 
on land holdings, whilst promoting farming practices that can increase yields on cultivated/grazed areas 
could help mitigate the trade-offs between protecting natural vegetation and food production objectives 
that we document. Such conditionalities would need to be coupled with mechanisms, such as 440 
agricultural extension assistance, to ensure that poorer and disadvantaged farmers (e.g. those with small 
land areas) are able to comply and are not discouraged from accessing social security programs. These 
conditionalities will not, however, curb negative environmental effects from non-recipient farmers who 
respond to program induced stimulation of local markets.  
Conditional cash transfers (BF) are associated with improved educational metrics in a few 445 
states, but they have had limited effectiveness in alleviating multi-dimensional poverty and health 
benefits (a key dimension of poverty). This seems likely to have been primarily driven by a diversion 
of funds to cash transfers and away from the institutions and infrastructure that are also needed to deliver 
health improvements (35, 55, 56). Reversing this change is likely to be costly but beneficial in delivering 
target outcomes. Conditioning receipts of benefits on maintaining some production of staple crops could 450 
also limit a shift away from staple crop production, which has probably also contributed to limited 
alleviation of multi-dimensional poverty and health outcomes, and increase family farmers’ resilience 
against price shocks.   
National and local contexts need to be considered when social protection programs are 
designed, implemented and evaluated. Our analyses can, however, inform discussion of the ZH inspired 455 
social protection programs that currently operate in sub-Saharan Africa, (e.g. conditional cash-transfers 
in Ghana (67), Purchase  from Africa for Africans (PAA Africa) in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Niger, and Senegal (68), and rural credit in Zimbabwe (69)). Crop yields in these regions are typically 
stagnant, and are even falling in some locations, against a background of rapid rises in demand due to 
human population growth rates (70). Experimental and theoretical evidence, however, strongly indicate 460 
the potential for changes in agricultural practice to close yield gaps across much of sub-Saharan Africa 
and meet increasing demand when combined with additional intensification measures including 
irrigation and increased cropping frequency (71).  Targeting poverty through improving market access 
and off-farm opportunities will also make substantial contributions to increasing food security in sub-
Saharan Africa (72). ZH derived social protection programs that simultaneously tackle poverty and food 465 
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production are thus well placed to contribute to tackling the region’s food insecurity. This is also likely 
to generate health outcomes as food insecurity is a major contributor to poor health in sub-Saharan 
Africa (5). Our results highlight a number of factors that are likely to enhance the success of ZH inspired 
programs in sub-Saharan Africa and reduce trade-offs with other SDGs. Program effectiveness is likely 
to be particularly influenced by associated investment in health infrastructure and improved functioning 470 
of institutions, including site specific agricultural extension offices (73, 74), which are often limited in 
rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa (11, 75). Despite the potential to improve food production without 
requiring agricultural expansion that trades off against protecting natural vegetation and associated 
biodiversity and carbon stocks, avoidance of such negative synergies is likely to require including 
environmental conditionalities in social protection programs. This will also require supporting 475 
agricultural extension offices to advice on environmental aspects and institutional capacity to monitor 
compliance. Regular fine-scale monitoring and evaluations of interventions that consider social, 
economic and biophysical heterogeneity will also enhance outcomes by suggesting pathways towards 
program improvement during implementation cycles. 
While our analyses reveal that investment in ZH may have been less successful in meeting some 480 
of its objectives than indicated by previous analyses, we provide nation-wide evidence that investment 
has benefitted food production, and in some regions has additionally benefitted, multi-dimensional 
poverty and natural vegetation, particularly from interventions providing rural credit to family farmers. 
Recent political changes in Brazil have led to substantial budget cuts for core sub-programs assessed in 
this paper (76). Our analyses indicate that these policy changes may halt or even reverse advances that 485 
Brazil has made towards increasing food availability (SDG 2), reducing poverty (SDG 1), and 
conserving natural vegetation and its associated benefits (SDGs 13 & 15).  
Materials and Methods 
Our analysis relies on a longitudinal dataset spanning the period between 2000 and 2013, and covering 
between 3,786 and 4,976 rural municipalities in Brazil. This dataset is constructed from publicly 490 
available national and global datasets. Our identification strategy leverages heterogeneity in investment 
levels in ZH and its core sub-programs (BF and PRONAF) to assess how social protection programs 
influence a range of key indicators linked to multiple sustainable development outcomes: multi-
dimensional poverty (SDG 1), food security (SDG 2), health (SDG 3), and natural vegetation changes 
(relating to action to tackle climate change SDG 13 and life on land SDG 15). We conduct all our 495 
calculations in R version 3.4.2 (77), and improve the causal inference of our analysis by using a quasi-
experimental design. This design uses a suite of 15 key biophysical and socioeconomic variables to 
control for potential factors affecting ZH investment and our outcomes of interest, and to generate a 
series of covariate balancing generalized propensity score weights. We also conduct a series of 
robustness tests to verify that our results are not unduly influenced by data quality, spatial 500 
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autocorrelation, and endogeneity. Please refer to the Supplementary Information for a detailed 
description of our methods, including i) the construction of indicators, treatment variables, covariates 
and respective data sources; ii) information on our regression model specifications and quasi-
experimental design; and iii) robustness tests.  
Data Availability 505 
The data and analysis code have been deposited on the Harvard Dataverse [link: both data and code will 
be uploaded upon acceptance]. 
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Table 1. Impacts of per capita summed Zero Hunger (ZH), Bolsa Familia (BF) and PRONAF investment on food 
production, multi-dimensional poverty, child malnutrition, infant mortality and natural vegetation cover from robust 
multivariable regression models of a covariate-balanced sample that take confounding factors into account. 
 
ZH BF PRONAF 
Outcome Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 
Kcalories (per capita) 0.002±0.04 0.958 2E-09 0.93 -0.02±0.02 0.454 1E-17 0.93 0.03±0.01 0.005 2E-54 0.94 
Protein (per capita) 0.08±0.01 1E-08 1E-25 0.96 0.08±0.02 5.E-06 9E-14 0.96 0.04±0.01 3.E-06 6E-76 0.96 
Multi-dim. poverty (census) -0.01±0.01 0.144 4.E-07 0.77 0.05±0.01 6.E-07 0.001 0.79 -0.02±0.004 1.E-06 9E-09 0.77 
Multi-dim. poverty (SIAB) 0.01±0.01 0.380 
 
0.61 0.08±0.02 2.E-06 
 
0.61 0.002±0.01 0.850 0.013 0.61 
Child Malnutrition (SIAB) 0.05±0.04 0.192 
 
n/a 0.18±0.05 4.E-04 
 
n/a -0.05±0.03 0.099 
 
n/a 
Infant Mortality (census) 0.01±0.24 0.961 
 
0.13 0.05±0.22 0.805 
 
0.14 -0.01±0.24 0.976 
 
0.14 
Infant Mortality (SIAB) 0.01±0.04 0.777 
 
n/a 0.16±0.05 0.002 
 
n/a -0.02±0.04 0.660 
 
n/a 
Natural Veg. (km2) -0.01±0.004 9.E-05 9.E-06 0.99 -0.03±0.01 9.E-05 0.004 0.99 -0.01±0.003 0.018 5.E-05 0.99 
Outcomes refer to daily per capita kilocalorie and protein production, multi-dimensional poverty in the entire population (Census) and in the poorer sectors 
of society (SIAB), child malnutrition in the poorer sectors (SIAB), infant mortality in the entire population (Census) and the poorer sectors (SIAB), and area 
of natural vegetation. Model coefficients are reported ± one standard error. Interaction terms (Int.) show p-values for the interactions between investment 
and state in all models except the natural vegetation model in which the interaction is with biome type. When interaction terms are not significant we report 
results from models that only contain main effects. State and biome have been encoded with deviation (effects) coding, thus for models with an interaction 
the main effects expressed here represent the average effect of investment across Brazil. Daily per capita kilocalorie and protein production,   multi-
dimensional poverty (census), multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) and area of natural vegetation are modelled using robust OLS, whilst infant mortality 
(census) is modelled using a Negative Binomial model, and infant mortality- and child malnutrition (SIAB) are modelled with a Quasi-Poisson model. Model 
r2 for infant mortality (census) is calculated using McFaddens pseudo r2 and is thus not comparable to those from OLS models. No pseudo-r2 is available 













Fig. 1. Relative impact of Zero Hunger, Bolsa Familia and PRONAF investment (column 1-3) on daily per capita kilocalorie 
production, daily per capita protein production, multi-dimensional poverty in the entire population (census), multi-
dimensional poverty in the poorer sectors of society (SIAB), child malnutrition in the poorer sectors of society (SIAB) and 
natural vegetation cover (km2). Relative impact is defined as the modelled change (%) in the outcome variable when 
investment increases from a spatially uniform negligible value (1st percentile value) to the actual investment level. Column 
4 shows outcome values at baseline (i.e. year 2000 for multi-dimensional poverty (census) and 2004 for all others). Relative 
impact calculations are based on robust multivariable regression models of a covariate-balanced sample (Table 1) that take 
confounding factors into account including interactions between investment and state, or biome (in the natural vegetation 
cover model). States and biomes with significantly different outcomes to the overall effect are indicated by thick black 
borders; thin black border show region borders (row 1-5) and ecological biome borders (row 6). We use a normative colour 
scheme, where in columns 1-3 blue indicates beneficial impacts and red non-beneficial impacts. In maps of baseline values 
(column 4) deeper red indicates municipalities with a worse starting condition, such as high multi-dimensional poverty or 
lower coverage of natural vegetation. Grey areas signify municipalities not included in the analysis because they were 




Fig. 2. Positive synergies (win-wins), trade-offs (win-lose) and negative synergies (lose-lose) from a) ZH, b) BF and c) 
PRONAF investment across three examples of sustainability outcomes, i.e. changes in per capita protein production 
(SDG 2), multi-dimensional poverty (census; SDG 1) and natural vegetation (SDGs 13 & 15). These have been selected 
as examples of key outcomes related to divergent SDGs. Coloured bands indicate the type of relationship (positive 
synergies (win-win), negative synergies (loose-loose) or trade-offs) between outcome variables; with the thickness of 
each link representing the percentage of municipalities that exhibit each type of relationship for each pair of outcome 
variables (indicated by the scale bar on the edge of each circle). Impact of program outcomes is calculated from robust 
multivariable regression models of a covariate-balanced sample (Table 1; n = 4,663-4,924 municipalities depending on 
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Unit of Analysis. We compile data at the municipality level, i.e. Brazil’s lowest administrative unit. 
We confine analyses to rural municipalities because ZH policies implemented in rural and urban areas 
differ in their implementation, mechanisms, and effectiveness (1, 2), and because small rural farmers 
are vital for national food security. Small farmers produce 70% of the food consumed in Brazil but also 35 
suffer disproportionately from food insecurity (2). We use the OECD definition of urbanisation, 
excluding municipalities with human population densities above 150 inhabitants/km² (3), as the official 
Brazilian definition overestimates the distribution of urban areas (4). 
During our study period 41 municipalities split into two or more municipalities. In these cases, 
we recalculate data for the end of the study period to match the original municipality boundaries at the 40 
start of the study period using two approaches. If data were available for each of the new municipalities 
we summed these and then recalculated data based on the older municipality boundaries. Alternatively 
we calculated weighted means based on municipality area for average slope, average elevation, and 
drought incidence; and by population size for census derived infant mortality and life expectancy. 
Municipalities which merged during our study period (four for the 2004-2013 analyses and 45 for the 45 
2000-2010 analyses) had to be excluded because the change in municipality borders (multiple 
municipalities merged to create single municipalities) were such that 2010 or 2013 (endpoint) values 
could not be accurately assigned baseline values. See Table S10 for more details of specific model 
exclusions and Table S1 for final sample sizes.  
 50 
Outcome variables. We use eight response variables to cover key dimensions of food availability, 
multi-dimensional poverty, health and natural vegetation loss. Our models include values at the start of 
program implementation to control for baseline conditions. 
 
Food production. We use daily per capita kilocalorie and protein production. We use these two 55 
measures to make a distinction between food quantity (kilocalories) and food quality (protein) (5). Both 
measures are based on annual municipal agricultural production data from the national statistics office 
IBGE (6). We combine twelve main Brazilian agricultural products, and convert each quantity produced 
(kg/tonnes) into kilocalorie and protein metrics using standard Brazilian and/or US product 
macronutrient/food energy values (7, 8). We use the average of these two values when both are available 60 
(Table S5). We then convert to daily per capita values based on the municipality’s population size in 
the focal year (using data from IBGE: https://www.ibge.gov.br/). The agricultural data does not include 
27 
 
subsistence food production, but this is a small and declining proportion of total production due to the 
shift towards a more modernized market oriented agricultural systems (9).  
 65 
Multi-dimensional poverty (MPI). We use data from the 2000 and 2010 demographic census to 
generate a multi-dimensional poverty measure, which we refer to as multi-dimensional poverty 
(census). Our measure combines equally weighted data on health, education, and living standards based 
on the recommendations of Alkire and Foster (10). Because household-level data are not available as 
part of the census micro-data, we use the geometric mean from all census households to generate our 70 
combined multi-dimensional poverty measure. This general approach follows the method used to 
calculate Brazil’s official Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) (11), which is closely 
correlated with our measure (r = 0.90 and 0.84 for 2000 and 2010, respectively), despite the underlying 
dimensions being somewhat different. We do not, for instance, include a financial income variable and 
rather include information on living standards given it is a more direct measure of deprivation of 75 
capabilities in line with the rationale of the MPI (10). For the education dimension we focus solely on 
primary and lower secondary school attendance, which is compulsory in Brazil, as this is a main focus 
of ZH programs (9). Fig. S3 illustrates relationships between the multi-dimensional poverty (census) 
and MHDI dimensions. Whilst the need to use the geometric mean (due to data availability) prevents 
us from assessing changes in the number of people below set poverty thresholds (10), our index provides 80 
a strong indicator of temporal change in multi-dimensional poverty. In addition, we use data from the 
Brazilian National Primary Information System (SIAB) for 2004 and 2013 (12), which we refer to as 
multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) to assess multi-dimensional poverty change in the poorer sectors of 
society. SIAB contains information for all families targeted by The Family Health Program. This is the 
national decentralised primary health care program aimed at providing health care coverage especially 85 
in deprived areas (13). The multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) measure combines equally weighted data 
on health, education, and living standards but uses slightly different variables for each dimension than 
those used by multi-dimensional poverty (census) due to differences in primary data collection (see 
Table S6). Our two poverty measures are thus related but not directly equivalent. 
 90 
Child malnutrition and infant mortality. We use child malnutrition and infant mortality as measures 
of food insecurity and health (14). Our measures of infant mortality are derived from both the national 
census and SIAB. The national census does not include child malnutrition measure and these data are 
derived solely from SIAB. Our malnutrition data combines data on underweight new-borns and 
underweight children (between 12 and 24 months). We combine these two measures using the 95 
geometric mean. We avoid double counting children weighed more than once at age one by selecting 
records for only four months a year, selecting the two wettest and two driest months per municipality 
per year to avoid a temporal bias, based on fine-scale monthly municipal rainfall data (15). Our measure 
of infant mortality is the number of annual infant deaths (children <1 year) per 100,000 live births. We 
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use data from both SIAB and the national demographic census as this allows us to consider infant 100 
mortality both in poorer sectors of society, and the entire municipal population. We define child 
malnutrition per 10,000 children, and infant mortality per 100,000 live births, rather than the more 
standard per 1,000 and 100, respectively, in order to retain more information when modelled using a 
Poisson modelling framework which does not allow decimal values. 
 105 
Natural vegetation cover. We use a 30m resolution Landsat-derived remote sensing product published 
by The Brazilian Annual Land Use and Land Cover Mapping Project v2 (16). Our measure focuses 
specifically on natural vegetation change for each of the six Brazilian biomes (Amazon rainforest, 
Cerrado, Caatinga, Pantanal, Atlantic Forest, and Pampa). The MapBiomas dataset maps vegetation 
cover according to 28 vegetation classes: we use 12 classes to construct our area under natural 110 
vegetation (Table S7). We calculate area of natural vegetation in each municipality and validate these 
estimates by comparison with alternative datasets, i.e. Terra Class for the Amazon and Cerrado, 
PMDBBS for the Caatinga and Cerrado, and SOS Atlantic Forest (Table S8). We only consider pixels 
that have been observed in both years and also ensure that the majority of each municipality in the 
analysis is consistently observed by excluding 17 municipalities where less than 50% of the total area 115 
was observed in either 2004 or 2013 due to cloud cover. As a robustness test we also consider a more 
stringent threshold and exclude municipalities with >5% cloud cover in either 2004 or 2013.     
 
Treatment variables - ZH policy implementation. We use data on annual municipal investments 
obtained via government managed online platforms (www.dados.gov.br and www.mds.gov.br) of the 120 
four main ZH sub-programs: PRONAF, PAA, PNAE and BF. All four sub-programs grew steadily 
since inception (Fig. S4), and show large spatial variation in investment across Brazil (Fig. S1). We 
exclude other minor sub-programs because they lack data at a municipal level and are much more 
limited in geographical spread. Information on the number of beneficiaries is publicly available for 
some ZH sub-programs, but this variable is not defined in a consistent way as one beneficiary could 125 
represent one individual, one co-operative that contains multiple farmers (but an unknown number of 
farmers or people) or one family that contains an unknown number of family members. It is thus 
impossible to use such data to capture the number of individuals in a municipality targeted by the ZH 
program or its sub-programs. A financial value capturing ZH program investment is thus more 
appropriate for quantifying spatial variation in investment. 130 
 We measure ZH investment as the summed per capita financial investment allocated to each 
municipality from the four sub-programs between 2004 and 2013. The ZH program was officially 
launched in 2003. However, we focus the majority of our analysis from 2004 onwards because 
investment levels in the program’s first year were small (17, 18) and major changes to ZH’s largest sub-
program, BF, were implemented in 2004 (19). PAA investment is included from 2006 onwards 135 
(inclusive) due to insufficient data availability but investment prior to 2006 was minimal (Fig. S4). For 
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analyses using outcome variables spanning 2000 to 2010, we match investment to the same time frame 
and measure ZH as summed ZH sub-program investment from 2000 to 2010. Investment values are 
expressed as 2013 values (in units of R$1000 per capita; using population data from IBGE) using 
Brazil’s inflation index IGP-DI.  140 
 
Confounding variables. We extract data on 15 biophysical and socio-economic factors that are used 
to calculate covariate balance generalized propensity scores and thus limit potential non-random 
treatment allocation bias by reducing the correlation between treatment and potential confounding 
factors. The variables are also used as control variables in our regression models. Here we describe each 145 
variable and the rationale for inclusion. 
 
i) Total municipal area. Administrative area can significantly influence social and environmental 
outcomes in impact estimation studies (20), and has been linked to implementation efficiency of BF 
(21). Municipal area data are taken from IBGE (https://www.ibge.gov.br/). 150 
 
ii) States. States in Brazil have substantial decision-making power, heterogeneous economies, and 
receive different amounts of federal financial support (9) which could influence the effectiveness of ZH 
investment.  
 155 
iii) Ecological biome. Brazil can be divided into six ecologically distinct biomes (Amazon rainforest, 
Cerrado, Caatinga, Pantanal, Atlantic Forest, and Pampa). These differ substantially in ecological and 
biophysical conditions and degree of protection (22), with significant implications for agricultural 
production and rural livelihoods and interpretation of the effects of natural vegetation loss. We calculate 
the percentage land cover of each biome within each municipality using official biome boundaries (23). 160 
When using biome as a predictor in models of food security, health and multi-dimensional poverty 
outcomes we assign a specific biome to each municipality if ≥ 80% of a municipality’s area falls within 
a single biome, and assign each of the 253 municipalities that did not meet this criterion to one of seven 
transition categories (e.g. Cerrado/Atlantic forest) creating a 13 level factor (Biome 13cat). When 
modelling natural vegetation we classified each municipality as the biome which comprised the 165 
majority of land cover (creating a 6 level factor; Biome 6cat) as use of the transition categories adversely 
affected model convergence.   
 
iv) Population density. Population pressure is a key driver of land-use change and can have substantial 
effects on land-use practices, access to resources and ultimately, livelihoods (24). We measure baseline 170 




v) GDP per capita from public services. Financial support for local institutions can have substantial 
effect on livelihoods and wellbeing. We measure baseline levels of per capita municipal spending on 
public administration including areas of health, education and social security (25). We deflate these 175 
values relative to 2013, expressed per capita (in R$1,000 units) using population data from IBGE. 
 
vi) Electoral patterns.  
Electoral patterns can influence public spending (26–28), and thus influence our treatment allocation. 
This could arise if parties that are in power invest more in regions in which they have a high share of 180 
the vote (to reward voters) or potentially increased investment in regions where vote share is lower (to 
encourage more votes in subsequent elections). These mechanisms could apply to national elections, as 
ZH investment is partly dependent on financial transfers to municipalities from federal government. 
They could also apply, however, in elections held at the municipality level as municipalities have 
substantial autonomy in deciding social policies and budget (29). We thus calculate three measures of 185 
electoral patterns using data from the Superior Electoral Court data repository (30): V1) Average 
municipal vote share (%), per municipality, in the presidential elections for the winning candidate, V2) 
Sum of years (over the focal period of our analysis) the municipality’s mayor is from the same party as 
that of the current president, and V3) Sum of years the municipality’s mayor is from a main party in 
Brazil. For V3 we create one variable for each of six major parties in Brazil (PMDB, PSDB, PFL, PTB, 190 
PP, and PT), as together they made up 70% and 67% of all mayor positions in the 2000-2010 and 2004-
2013 periods, respectively. Elections are generally held in the fall therefore we only expect vote share 
for a winning party in one year, e.g. 2000, to have an influence on treatment allocation in the subsequent 
year, i.e. 2001. The contribution of each year to these three metrics is weighted by the proportion of 
investment that relates to that year, i.e. electoral patterns that could influence investment levels in years 195 
when investment in ZH is higher have greater weight. Relationships were consistently limited between 
investment and V2 (largest Spearmans’ rho coefficient = 0.051) and V3 (largest Spearmans’ rho 
coefficient = 0.149), but much larger correlations arose between investment and V1 (largest Spearmans’ 
rho coefficient = 0.712: Table S9), and we thus select V1 as the most important variable to control for 
electoral patterns. 200 
 
vii – ix) Land use. To account for any influence of the agricultural sector on our outcome variables we 
control for Area under crop production- (6) and Area under pasture at baseline (31). Area under crop 
production at baseline respectively refers to year 2000 and 2004 for the 2000-2010 and 2004-2013 
models. Area under pasture is measured in 2006, a few years after our baselines as data for earlier years 205 
were not available. We use the 2006 census data rather than MapBioma’ data because a large proportion 
of Brazil’s farm area is classified as “agriculture or pasture” in the MapBiomass dataset (24% in version 
3, accessed February 2019 www.mapbiomas.org/stats) thus creating considerable uncertainty in 
estimates of the amount of crop and pasture land.  
31 
 
We also control for the area of small-scale farms, i.e. area by farms <50 ha at baseline (31), again only 210 
available for 2006. We adopt this size threshold rather than the frequently used 2 hectare threshold 
because this excludes a substantial proportion of smallholder agriculture (32).  
 
x) Remoteness. We control for remoteness, i.e. municipal travel time to a major city, which we use as a 
proxy for municipal access to larger markets and health services. We adapt the algorithm used by the 215 
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (33), and incorporate information on land cover 
(34), transportation routes (35), and slope and elevation (36), to arrive at the fastest travel time from 
each municipality centroid to a major city, following Oldekop et al. (37). We use cities with at least 
50,000 inhabitants as this is where large markets and adequate health services tend to be found (38, 39). 
Note that these travel times are correlated with travel times to both smaller and larger cities: 10,000 (r 220 
= 0.94), 150,000 (r = 0.86) and 250,000 inhabitants (0.74).  
 
xi) Drought intensity. Drought could have adversely impacted our baseline and current food security 
measures (40–42). We calculate an average municipal drought index using the global Standardised 
Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI)(43). This continuous index ranges from -2 (extremely 225 
dry) to +2 (extremely wet) and is a standardized variable (mean zero and unit variance) expressed as 
the deviation of the current climatic balance (precipitation minus evapotranspiration potential) from the 
long-term (1901-2013) climatic balance. We use the average drought index per municipality, for three 
years spanning both sides of our baseline and endpoint years and then subtract the baseline index from 
the endpoint index to create a single measure which effectively captures the change in drought intensity 230 
over the period in which we measure the change in our outcome variables. 
 
xii) Agricultural credit. We also consider possible effects of other farming assistance programs. We 
control for the amount of rural agricultural credit per capita (that is not PRONAF credit) regulated by 
the Brazilian Central Bank (44) allocated to each municipality for the full period in which we measure 235 
change in our outcome variables (2000-2010 and 2004-2013). We deflate these values relative to 2013, 
expressed per capita (in R$1,000 units) using population data from IBGE.  Rural credit can influence 
food security (45, 46) and land use change (47). 
 
xiii-xiv) Slope and elevation. We calculate and control for average slope (in degrees) and average 240 
elevation (in meters) per municipality using the global digital elevation model v2 (36), on the basis that 
both contribute to agro-ecological conditions which affect food production, natural vegetation cover 
and livelihoods (48). 
 
xv) Conservation policies. We control for Area under protection (at baseline) when we model the effect 245 
of ZH investment on natural vegetation cover, based on previous studies showing the influence of 
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protection on deforestation (20, 49). Boundaries of all designated protected areas, i.e. IUCN categories 
I-VI and indigenous areas, were obtained from the World database on Protected Areas 
(www.wdpa.org). We only consider protected areas established by 2004, but note that the area under 




Covariate Balancing Generalized Propensity Score. We create Covariate Balancing Generalized 
Propensity Score weights (CBGPS) using the “CBPS” package (50) to capture potential treatment 255 
selection bias, i.e. dependence between treatment assignment and outcome given covariates (predictor 
variables), which if left untreated can bias the estimated effects of interest (51). The approach builds on 
previous methods of impact estimation using observational data, is shown to increase the robustness to 
model misspecification, and is applicable to a continuous treatment variable such as our measures of 
ZH investment (50). 260 
The covariate balancing CBGPS method (50) offers both a parametric and non-parametric 
calculation to generate covariate balancing weights. In the parametric calculation a generalized 
propensity score is estimated by modelling treatment (i.e. level of ZH investment) as the function of 
pre-treatment covariates. Then inverse probability weights, whose aim is to ensure the lowest possible 
correlation between treatment and covariates, are created on the basis of the generalized propensity 265 
score. The non-parametric calculation does not directly estimate a generalized propensity score in the 
first instance but rather uses an empirical likelihood approach to choose inverse probability weights 
which ensure minimal correlation between treatment and covariates (for more detail see (50)).  
We use both approaches and retain the weights that result in the greatest improvements in 
balance, i.e. the lowest correlation between investment (treatment) and confounding variables. We 270 
create distinct weights for each individual regression model, and use the same predictor variables to 
create the covariate balancing weights as those used in the subsequent adjusted regression model (see 
Table S1 for a full list of predictor variables used).  
The weights resulted in great reductions in treatment-covariate correlations in all our regression 
models, and an average treatment-covariate correlation for each model of 0.07 (compared to an original 275 
average treatment-covariate correlation of 0.14) (Fig. S5). 
 
Model structure and variable transformations. The appropriate model structure for each outcome 
variable was decided by fitting four potential theoretical distributions (normal, log-normal, Poisson and 
Negative binomial) to each outcome using R’s “fitdistrplus” package (52). Daily per capita Kcalorie 280 
and protein production, multi-dimensional poverty (census), multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) and 
natural vegetation cover fit a log-normal distribution and are subsequently modelled using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions after transforming the dependent variables to log base ten. The 
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investment variable and continuous covariates (except drought intensity and electoral patterns) are also 
transformed to log base ten, as this yields improved fit of linear relationships and Gaussian distributions 285 
of resultant model residuals. For the variables that include zero we add a constant of half of the 
minimum value before applying log transformations. Model diagnostics revealed the presence of 
outliers and we thus use R’s “robustbase” package with the MM-estimator to conduct robust regressions 
that reduce the influence of outliers on model outputs (53). This frequently used technique has a high 
statistical efficiency and can cope with multiple outliers without breaking down (54). The MM-290 
estimator also provides standard errors which are robust against  heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
(54).  
Child malnutrition (SIAB), infant mortality (census) and infant mortality (SIAB) were count 
data and exhibited over-dispersed Poisson distributions, tested using R’s “AER” package (55). We 
modelled Infant mortality (SIAB) and Child malnutrition (SIAB) using a quasi-Poisson model and 295 
Infant mortality (census) using a negative binomial model. The choice between the two model structures 
was based on the outcome’s mean-variance structure (56), selecting quasi-Poisson models when there 
was a linear relationship between the mean and variance. A robust MM-estimator cannot be calculated 
for Quasi-Poisson and Negative Binomial models. We thus follow the suggestion from Coxe et al. (57) 
and use another measure of influence, DFBETAS, to conduct analyses that are equivalent to robust 300 
regressions. DFBETAS can be calculated for each regression coefficient to “assess the number of 
standard deviations by which an individual changes each regression coefficient” p. 130 (57). Based on 
the most theoretically important variable for us – the investment variable – we run robust models which 
exclude highly influential points for the investment regression coefficient, defined as DFBETAS above 
the recommended DFBETAS cut-off of 2/sqrt (n) (57, 58).  305 
 
Interaction terms. State and biome predictors are coded using deviation coding (also known as effect 
coding). State- investment and biome- investment interaction terms are retained when 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) for the added parameter(s) exclude zero, and when there is improvement in model fit, 
judged for most models by a decrease in model’s AIC value (of at least 2 AIC points) and judged in 310 
robust models calculated with an MM-estimator by adjusted  R2 values (59). State-investment 
interactions were retained when modelling per capita Kcalorie-, per capita protein and multi-
dimensional poverty (census) as a function of summed ZH, PRONAF and BF investment, when using 
all data and when excluding lower quality data, as well as when modelling multi-dimensional poverty 
(SIAB) as a function of PRONAF investment using all data, and multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) as 315 
a function of BF investment when excluding lower quality data.  Biome-investment interactions were 
retained when modelling natural vegetation cover as a function of summed ZH, BF and PRONAF 
investment. All state and biome interaction effects are expressed relative to the main investment 




Visualising investment impacts. We use the resultant regression equations from core models to 
quantify the impact of investment by calculating the predicted value of our outcome variables under 
three scenarios i) a spatially uniform negligible investment level (defined as the 1st percentile 
investment value, thus ensuring we predict inside the range of our data), ii) the actual investment 
received in each municipality, and iii) spatially uniform investment levels equating to the 50th 325 
percentile investment level. We then generate maps of relative impact of actual investment (defined as 
percentage change in predicted outcome between a negligible and actual investment) (Fig. 1). Because 
ZH investment was highly spatially heterogeneous (Fig S1), we also generate maps of relative impact 
under a spatially uniform investment level (defined as percentage change in predicted outcome between 
a negligible and a 50th percentile investment level) (Fig. S2). This mapping approach helps to visualise 330 
spatial variation in the effectiveness of investment whilst accounting for heterogeneity in the magnitude 
of investment. 
 
Robustness tests. We run robustness tests to look for potential sources of sampling bias or data quality 
issues, lack of independence amongst observations (spatial autocorrelation), and lack of independence 335 
between the treatment variable and error term (endogeneity). Checking for spatial autocorrelation and 
endogeneity also provide information on the potential presence of unmeasured confounders (60, 61). 
 
Data Quality. We re-run models excluding municipalities for which there was uncertainty about data 
quality, defined as: i) municipalities larger than 10,000 km2 as larger municipalities are more likely to 340 
have unrepresentative socio-economic data (62); ii) for models using SIAB data (child malnutrition, 
infant mortality and multi-dimensional poverty) municipalities that did not meet the ten quality criteria 
set by Brazil’s Ministry of Health for SIAB data (63) (e.g. municipalities with small sample sizes in the 
microdata (e.g. <100 families/350 people registered with data), limited temporal data (e.g. 
municipalities with 0 families attended to in a month), or non-logical data (e.g. >1000 infant deaths per 345 
1000 live births) (see Table S10 for a full list of criteria), and iii) for natural vegetation cover models, 
municipalities in which cloud cover in the natural vegetation dataset covered more than 5% of the 
surface area in either 2004 (the baseline) or 2013 as this could reduce the accuracy of natural vegetation 
cover estimates.   
The number of municipalities excluded due to possible quality issues range from 98 to 1,847 350 
depending on the outcome variable (Table S10). Exclusions based on municipality size, employed to 
all models, exclude 0-61% of municipalities in a state with the largest effects in northern and centre-
western states. Exclusions based on high cloud cover, employed to the natural vegetation cover models, 
affect 12 of 16 states situated in the north or north-east, and one state elsewhere (Rio Grande do Sul in 
the south) reducing state sample sizes by between 1 and 75%. The largest exclusions occur in models 355 
using SIAB data (multi-dimensional poverty-, child malnutrition-, and infant mortality) based on the 
Ministry of Health’s quality criteria, with 15 to 100% of municipalities being excluded per state. Whilst 
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Amapa (in the north) was the only state from which all municipalities were excluded there is no marked 
geographical variation in the percentage of municipalities that are excluded. When combining data 
quality criteria robustness models excluded 77.0% and 99.7% of the Amazon and Pantanal biomes’ 360 
area, thus generating significant spatial bias. We thus exclude these biomes from the robustness models 
assessing change in natural vegetation cover.  
 In a quarter of the models (6 of 24) inference varies between core and robustness models (i.e. 
the PRONAF and per capita Kcalorie production and natural vegetation change models, BF and SIAB 
derived multi-dimensional poverty model, the BF infant mortality (SIAB) model, and when assessing 365 
the impact of overall ZH and BF investment on natural vegetation change in the Caatinga) we discuss 
discrepancies in the main text (although the impact on our inference is rather limited). In all other cases 
inference from the robustness and core models was extremely similar and we focus on the results from 
the core model as this enables us to visualise modelled impacts across Brazil. There were occasional 
small differences, however, in the precise location and extent of areas in which treatment impacts are 370 
significant and non-negligible. Specifically, i) in one state (Para in the north) the effect of PRONAF 
investment on per capita protein production changes from a predicted increase in outcome in the core 
model to a predicted reduction in the robustness model; and ii) in one state (Mato Grosso in the central 
west) the effect of BF investment on per capita protein production changes from a predicted reduction 
in outcome in the core model to a predicted increase in the robustness model). 375 
 
Spatial autocorrelation. We assess the presence of spatial autocorrelation, given that this can violate 
the assumption of independence in classical statistics and influence results (64). Spatial autocorrelation 
also indicates that spatially determined unmeasured confounders may be present, further facilitating 
assessment of endogeneity (61). We test for spatial autocorrelation using two-sided Moran’s I tests 380 
implemented in R’s “spdep” package (65) on all core model residuals and model residuals from the 
covariate balancing stage (CBGPS). As only the parametric, and not the non-parametric, CBGPS 
models can provide residuals (50) we follow Oldekop et al. (66) and create our own propensity score 
models, i.e. in our case linear regressions where investment is the function of predictor variables, and 
test for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of these models. We do so using first a simple spatial 385 
neighbourhood matrix that classifies municipalities as neighbours if they share a common border. We 
then use a distance based neighbourhood matrix that generates a weight matrix based on inverted 
euclidian distance between each municipality centre, though capped at 0.75 of the maximum given the 
extreme sizes of some Brazilian municipalities.  
Moran’s I values for 78% of our models were not statistically significant. Where Moran’s I 390 
values were significant they were very close to zero (range -0.027 to 0.031; Table S11). We thus 
conclude that our model inference is not biased by spatial autocorrelation and that there is no evidence 




Endogeneity. Endogeneity between model error terms and investment variables can influence causal 395 
inference and such endogeneity is typically caused by unmeasured confounding variables (60).  A 
Hausman test can be used to test for endogeneity. This requires identifying the omitted variable that 
generates endogeneity, but this is rarely possible in observation studies (as is the case for our models), 
and selection of appropriate instrumental variables – which is often difficult (60). In the absence of the 
Hausman test we follow Oldekop et al.(66), and assess whether the error term (model residuals) and 400 
investment variable are correlated running a series of non-parametric Spearman’s rho correlation tests. 
The correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho) between model residuals and the model investment 
variable are very low for all core models and range from -0.085 to 0.049 (Table S12). Thus, we conclude 
there is no evidence of endogeneity between our investment variables and model error term, providing 







Table S1. Model variables for the Zero Hunger (ZH)-, Bolsa Familia (BF)- and PRONAF models 
Outcome Treatment  Confounding variables n 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  
log10(Kcal 
(pc)) 
log10(ZH)* State      
B 



























4,940 log10(BF)* State          
log10(PRONAF)* State         
log10(Protein 
(pc)) 
log10(ZH)* State        
 

























4,940 log10(BF)* State     B     

































4,976 log10(BF)* State          






























   
3,786 log10(BF)* State          






























   
3,828 log10(BF)* State       B   






























   
4,976 log10(BF)      B    






























   
4,305 log10(BF)      B    




log10(ZH)*Biome (6cat)        
 

























4,924 log10(BF)*Biome (6cat)       B  
log10(PRONAF)*Biome 
(6cat) 
        
Pc = per capita. B = baseline conditions of the outcome variable. N = model sample size. Outcome years correspond to 2010 for multi-dimensional poverty (census) and Infant mortality (census) (with 
corresponding baseline (B) values from 2000), all other outcomes for year 2013 (with B values from 2004). Three treatments are tested separately, i.e. total municipal ZH (sum of BF, PRONAF, PAA 
and PNAE), BF and PRONAF investment per capita from baseline to endpoint year. The confounding variables, whose inclusion in each model are indicated by ticks/B, are 1. ZH investment that is 
not captured in the sub-program (included in the BF and PRONAF models only), 2. State, 3. Biome (13cat), 4. Biome (6cat), 5. Kcal (pc), 6. Protein (pc), 7. Multi-dimensional poverty (census or SIAB), 
8. Infant mortality (census or SIAB), 9. Child malnutrition (SIAB), 10. Natural vegetation (km2), 11. GDP Public administration (pc), 12. Crop area (ha), 13. Pasture area (ha), 14. Small-scale farm area 
(ha), 15. Drought intensity, 16. Rural credit (pc), 17. Remoteness (Minutes), 18. Elevation (meter), 19. Slope (degree), 20. Municipal area (km2), 21. Population density, 22. Electoral patterns, and 23. 
Protected area (km2). Some models include an interaction term between treatment and state or biome (indicated by *). For the natural vegetation models Biome (6cat) is used instead of Biome (13cat), 
because the latter variable had too small sample sizes across the seven transition-biome categories for the models to run successfully with biome interaction effects. Time-variant confounding variables 
which might risk being influenced by the treatment are set at the baseline year to minimize influence from investment. Some exceptions exist, i.e. data for 13. Pasture area, and 14. Small-scale farm 
area are only available for 2006. Also, 7. baseline multi-dimensional poverty (census), which corresponds to year 2000, is used as a baseline confounding variable for the 2004-2013 Kilocalorie-, 
Protein- and Natural vegetation models as opposed to multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB) (which corresponds to year 2004) because the geographical coverage of multi-dimensional poverty (census) 
better matches the coverage of these outcome variables). Confounding variable 16. Rural credit incorporates data for the whole time-period as it is likely unaffected by treatment. Likewise 15. Drought 
intensity, incorporates three years spanning our baseline and endpoint years. All continuous variables besides the outcome for Infant mortality and Child malnutrition, and the Drought intensity 
confounding variable are transformed to log base 10. 
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Table S2. Descriptive statistics for all Zero Hunger (ZH)-, Bolsa Familia (BF)- and PRONAF model 
variables.  
Variable Description Time 
frame 
Mean SD 





Kilocalories produced per capita per day (pc/day) in 2013 and 
2004 
Endpoint 157,902 442,278 
Baseline 84,420 240,796 
Protein  
(gram pc/day) 
Grams of protein produced per capita per day in 2013 and 2004 Endpoint 1,975 5,665 
Baseline 1,410 3,916 
Multi-dim. poverty 
(census) 
Multi-dimensional poverty index for the entire population in 2010 
and 2000 
Endpoint 0.058 0.031 
Baseline 0.116 0.06 
Multi-dim. poverty 
(SIAB)  
Multi-dimensional poverty index in the poorer sectors of society in 
2013 and 2004 
Endpoint 0.059 0.039 
Baseline 0.07 0.04 
Underweight 
children (SIAB) 
Geometric mean of number of underweight children at birth- and 
age 12-24 months per 10,000 children in the poorer sectors of 
society 2013 and 2004 
Endpoint 253 290 
Baseline 665 458 
Infant mortality 
(census) 
Number of infant (<1 year) deaths per 100,000 live births for the 
entire population in 2010 and 2000 
Endpoint 1,958 717 
Baseline 3,393 1,388 
Infant  
mortality (SIAB) 
Number of infant (<1 year) deaths per 100,000 live births in the 
poorer sectors of society in 2013 and 2004 
Endpoint 2,255 11,072 
Baseline 2,547 2,589 
Natural vegetation 
cover (km2) 
Total area (km2) under natural vegetation in 2013 and 2004 Endpoint 1,078 5,331 
Baseline 1,103 5,402 
Treatment variables:  
 
ZH (R$/pc) Total per capita ZH investment in Brazilian Reals, i.e. sum of per 






















Census based multi-dimensional poverty index for year 2000 Baseline 0.116 0.06 
GDP Public 
Service (R$/pc) 










Crop area (ha) 
 





(% vote share) 
Average municipal vote share for the winning presidential 
candidate (%) for 2000-2010; and 2004-2013, with contribution of 
each years’ vote share weighted by the proportion of investment 

















   





Pasture area (ha) Total pasture area for year 2006 Baseline 31,003 81,712 
Small-scale farm 
area (< 50 ha) 





Travel time in minutes from the municipality centroid to the nearest 






Drought intensity, based on SPEI for baseline and endpoint 
periods (see SI Appendix for detailed description) 




Credit (R$/pc) Total rural non-PRONAF agricultural credit for 2000 – 2010; and 





Elevation (m) Average elevation within each municipality  456 281; 
Slope (degree) Average slope within each municipality  8.2 3.8; 
Pop.Density Total population per km2 for years 2000; and 2004 Baseline 30; 31 29; 30 
Municipality area 
(km2) 
Area within municipality boundaries in 2000; area within 
municipality boundaries in 2004; and area that was cloud free in 









Total area classified as strictly protected-, sustainable use 




State 26 levels (Federal District excluded because urban)   
Biome 13 levels (6 pure biome and 7 transition zones)   
Dependent variables and their baseline variable values are based on model sample sizes ranging 3,808-4,976 municipalities. 
Treatment and confounding variable values are based on the largest 2000-2010 and 2004-2013 model sample (n = 4,976 and 
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Table S3. Quality dataset robustness check model impacts of Zero Hunger (ZH), Bolsa Familia (BF) and PRONAF per 
capita investment  
 
 
ZH BF PRONAF 
Outcome Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 Coef±S.E. P Int. R2 
Kcalories (per capita) 0.01±0.02 0.629 2E-08 0.94 0.02±0.02 0.212 1E-20 0.93 0.02±0.01 0.148 7E-12 0.94 
Protein (per capita) 0.08±0.02 3.E-07 2E-42 0.96 0.09±0.02 3.E-05 1E-17 0.96 0.04±0.01 0.002 9E-103 0.96 
Multi-dim. poverty (census) -0.01±0.01 0.022 2.E-04 0.74 0.04±0.01 8.E-07 3E-08 0.77 -0.02±0.005 4.E-05 3E-10 0.76 
Multi-dim. poverty (SIAB) 0.02±0.01 0.116 
 
0.61 0.03±0.03 0.202 5.E-04 0.61 -0.02±0.02 0.230 
 
0.60 
Child Malnutrition (SIAB) 0.04±0.04 0.334 
 
n/a 0.15±0.07 0.025 
 
n/a -0.01±0.03 0.683 
 
n/a 
Infant Mortality (census) 0.01±0.24 0.983 
 
0.13 0.03±0.27 0.898 
 
0.14 0.01±0.22 0.962 
 
0.17 
Infant Mortality (SIAB) 0.07±0.06 0.241 
 
n/a 0.11±0.07 0.147 
 
n/a -0.04±0.05 0.439 
 
n/a 
Natural Veg. (km2) -0.01±0.004 0.005 9.E-05 0.99 -0.03±0.01 0.007 0.040 0.99 -0.01±0.004 0.169 3.E-05 0.99 
Model coefficients are reported ± one standard error. Interaction terms (Int.) show p-values for the interactions between investment and state in all models, 
except for the natural vegetation model in which the interaction is with biome type. When interaction terms are not significant we report results from models 
that only contain main effects. State and biome have been encoded with deviation (effects) coding, thus for models with an interaction the main effects 
expressed here represent the average effect of investment across Brazil. Daily per capita kilocalorie and protein production, multi-dimensional poverty 
and area of natural vegetation are modelled using robust OLS, whilst infant mortality (census) is modelled using a Negative Binomial model, and infant 
mortality- and child malnutrition (SIAB) are modelled with a Quasi-Poisson model. Model r2 for infant mortality (census) is calculated using McFaddens 
pseudo-R2 and is thus not comparable to those from OLS models. No pseudo-r2 is available for Quasi-Poisson models. All models have been adjusted to 









Outcome Coef±S.E. P Interaction term R2 
Education (census) 0.08±0.07 0.263 2.E-10 0.34 
Education (SIAB) -1.11±1.12 0.320 2.E-08 0.11 
Due to a heavy negative skew in the Education (census) dependent variable, an Ordered Quantile (ORQ) normalization 
transformation was carried out. This transformation was identified as the best transformation (out of 7 standard transformations) 
using R’s package “bestNormalize”. Model coefficients are reported ± one standard error. Interaction terms  report p-value for the 
interaction term between investment and state. In the Education (census) model 7 states showed a significant effect of BF 
investment on school attendance (Para, Rondonia, Alagoas and Bahia with significant increases, and Goias, Mato Grosso do 
Sul, and Parana with significant reductions). In the Education (SIAB) model 4 states showed a significant effect of BF investment 
on school attendance (Parana and Santa Catarina with significant increases, and Bahia and Piaui with significant reductions) 
State has been encoded with deviation (effects) coding, thus for models with an interaction the main effects expressed here 
represent the average effect of investment across Brazil. Both education models are modelled using covariate balance (CBGPS) 
adjusted robust OLS models. 
 
Table S5. Nutrient values used to convert production of (a) kg and (b) number of animals to 
corresponding quantities in kilocalories and grams of protein 
 

















Sugarcane  -  3,750 3,750 -  0 0.00 
Soyabeans  3,630 4,460 4,045 405 360 382.50 
Maize -  3,650 3,650 -  90 90.00 
Rice 3,400 3,650 3,525 78.1 70 74.05 
Cassava 1,330 1,600 1,465 13 10 11.50 
Milk 650 600 625 29.7 30 29.85 
(b) Kg meat/ 
animal 
      
Cattle  134.5a 1,388 2,340 1,864 200.7 190 195.35 
Buffalo 218.5b -  1,090 1,090 -  210  210.00 
Chicken 1.7c 2,090 -  2,090 171 -  171.00 
Sheep 6.5d 1,090 -  1,090 207.4 -  207.40 
Goat 5.8e -  1,090 1,090 -  210 210.00 
Pig 45.4f 1,720 1,850 1,788 198.7 195 196.85 
Twelve main agro-livestock products in Brazil are converted from (a) kg and (b) number of animals to corresponding quantities 
in kilocalories and grams of protein. For (b) each livestock type is first assigned an average weight of meat, and based on 
appropriate quantities in a Brazilian context converted from number of animals to kg, sources used being a(67), b(68), c(69), 
d(70), e(71), and f(72). Nutrient values are taken from the Brasilfoods (7) and USDA database (8), the average of the two used 


















Table S6. Data included to create the multi-dimensional poverty indices Multi-dimensional poverty 
(census) and Multi-dimensional poverty (SIAB).  
 Multi-dimensional poverty (census) Multi-dimensional poverty(SIAB) 
Health 
Infant mortality  
(infant deaths per 1,000 births) 
Infant mortality 
(infant deaths per 1,000 births) 
Life expectancy deprivation  
(deviation from expected living age w/global min 
and max years): 1-((LifeExpectancy-20)/(85-20)) 
Child malnutrition 
(underweight per 100 
weighted) 
Underweight at birth 
(per 100 weighed) 
Underweight age 1-2 
(per 100 weighed) 
Education 
No school attendance  
(% 7-14 year olds that do not attend primary 
school) 
No school attendance  
(% 7-14 year olds that do not attend primary school) 
Living 
standards 
No electricity  
(% people  without access to electricity) 
No electricity 
(% people* without access to electricity) 
Unsafe water  
(% people without piped water) 
Unsafe water 
(% people* without piped water) 
Inadequate sanitation  
(% people* without public system or septic tank) 
Inadequate sanitation 
(% people* without public system or tank) 
No assets 




(% people*living in houses with inadequate walls such 






Data included to create multi-dimensional poverty (census) is based on the Brazilian demographic census (73) while multi-
dimensional poverty (SIAB) on the national primary information system (SIAB) (12). All variables besides Life expectancy 
deprivation is expressed as the proportion of people. *indicates an original measure of %-households has been converted to %-
people based on average people per household per municipality published by IBGE. Each variable is negatively loaded and 
scaled between 0-1, and subsequently combined through geometric means to make higher order compound variables, the final 
indices ranging 0-1 where 1 equals complete multi-dimensional poverty 
 
 
Table S7. Vegetation cover categories from MapBiomas used to create an overall natural vegetation 
classification 
 
MapBiomas categories New categories 
Forest, Natural forest formations, Dense forest, Open forest, 
Mangrove forest, Flooded forest, Degraded forest, Secondary 
forest, Natural non-forest formations, Non-forest natural wetlands, 




Planted forest, Agro-livestock use, Pasture, Pasture in natural 
grasslands, Other pasture, Agriculture, Annual crops, Semi-
perennial crops (Sugarcane), Crop mosaics, Agriculture or 
pasture, Non-vegetative areas, Beaches and dunes, Urban 





Non observed Non observed 
Vegetation cover categories are taken from MapBiomas v2(16), and the overall natural vegetation classification created used to 
analyse the impact of Zero Hunger, Bolsa Familia and PRONAF investment on municipal area under natural vegetation. *Natural 











Table S8. Robustness check validating the accuracy of natural vegetation cover estimates per biome 





















comparing Map Biomass 
and alternative data 
sources’ estimates of 
natural vegetation cover 
per municipality  
N 
Amazon Terra Class 30 m 2014 83 86 0.992 399 
Cerrado Terra Class 1:250,000 2013 56 55 0.977 809 
Cerrado PMDBBS 1:250,000 2002 58 57 0.969 833 






2013 28 14 0.865 2448 
The accuracy of the 30 m resolution fine-scale natural vegetation maps of MapBiomas v2(16) is validated by considering the 
extent of natural vegetation categorized by MapBiomas (MB) compared to alternative vegetation maps within four main Brazilian 
biomes (Amazon, Cerrado, Caatinga and Atlantic Forest). TerraClass has a minimum detected area of approximately 6.25 ha 
(74).  First, we compare estimates of natural vegetation cover (%) as a proportion of total biome area using data from all 
municipalities. The discrepancy in natural vegetation cover for the Atlantic Forest is most likely caused by the lower resolution of 
the alternative map (SOS Mata Atlantica) and subsequent inability to pick up on the many small and fragmented natural vegetation 
areas typical for this biome. Second, Spearman’s rho correlations are calculated for  the two estimates of natural vegetation cover 
(km2) per municipality, N refers to the number of municipalities included in these analyses. Pre-processed Terra Class data for 
the Amazon were not available so we only use municipalities for which both data sources had extremely similar estimates of 
municipality size (<1% difference).  
 
Table S9. Correlation coefficients and associated P values for relationships between ZH-, BF and 
PRONAF investment and electoral patterns in Brazil 
  
ZH BF PRONAF 
Time frame Party Spearman’s rho P Spearman’s rho P Spearman’s rho P 
V1: Average municipal vote share (%) in presidential elections for the winning candidate 
2000-2010 
 
-0.076 8E-08 0.648 0E+00 -0.342 2E-136 
2004-2013 
 
0.064 6E-06 0.712 0E+00 -0.285 7E-93 
V2: Sum of years the municipality is governed by the same party as the current president 
2000-2010 
 
-0.051 0.0003 -0.046 0.001 -0.026 0.068 
2004-2013 
 
-0.004 0.775 -0.041 0.004 0.003 0.861 
V3: Sum of years the municipality is governed by a main party in Brazil 
2000-2010 PMDB 0.097 9E-12 -0.113 2E-15 0.122 8E-18 
2004-2013 PMDB 0.091 2E-10 -0.111 6E-15 0.117 2E-16 
2000-2010 PSDB -0.147 2E-25 -0.059 3E-05 -0.089 4E-10 
2004-2013 PSDB -0.154 2E-27 -0.088 7E-10 -0.077 8E-08 
2000-2010 PFL -0.001 0.953 0.149 4E-26 -0.057 0.0001 
2004-2013 PFL 0.009 0.517 0.150 4E-26 -0.057 0.0001 
2000-2010 PTB -0.028 0.053 0.057 0.0001 -0.038 0.007 
2004-2013 PTB -0.021 0.144 0.056 0.0001 -0.034 0.017 
2000-2010 PP 0.120 3E-17 -0.101 1E-12 0.121 1E-17 
2004-2013 PP 0.117 2E-16 -0.109 2E-14 0.145 1E-24 
2000-2010 PT -0.009 0.528 -0.046 0.001 0.017 0.219 
2004-2013 PT -0.004 0.775 -0.041 0.004 0.003 0.861 
Data on electoral patterns from the presidential elections (V1) and municipal elections (V2 and V3) for the time frames of the 
analysis (2000-2010 and 2004-2013) are taken from the Superior Electoral Court data repository (30).The contribution of each 
year to these three metrics is weighted by the proportion of investment that relates to that year, i.e. electoral trends in years 
when investment in ZH is higher have greater weight. Spearman’s Rho correlations between the electoral variables and ZH-, 
BF- and PRONAF investment variables show clear signs of a relationship with V1 (highlighted in bold), but no relationship with 




Table S10. Criteria, thresholds and rational used to exclude municipalities (M) from specific models to reduce bias in model estimates.  
 










1.1 Inconsistent municipality borders Merging municipalities for time periods 
2004-2013 and 2000-2010 
Spatial inconsistency All 4 – 45 
 
1.2 Inconsistent municipality borders Border change 2000–2004 Spatial inconsistency Kilocalorie, Protein and 
Natural vegetation 
128 
2 Urban municipalities > 150 inhabitants/km² Not target municipalities All 407 – 438 
3 Unidentifiable municipality IDs Mis-spelled names Erroneous reporting All 3 – 20 
4 Non-observed municipal area due to cloud cover > 50% Spatial inconsistency Natural vegetation 17 







































566 – 1847 
 
People registered < 350 Bias due to small sample size 
People registered within in all age groups 0 Bias due to small sample size 
Families attended to each month 0 Temporal bias 
Monthly medical visits to people with pregnancy, 
hypertension, diabetes, tuberculosis and leprosy 
< 10% Temporal bias 
Deviation between sum of people of all ages and 
total people registered 
> 10% Erroneous reporting 
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 born) > 1,000 Erroneous reporting 
Average people per family < 2 or > 8 Erroneous reporting 
Sex ratio < 0.5 or > 2 Erroneous reporting 
Average monthly visits per family < 0.2 or > 4 Erroneous reporting 
8 Non-observed municipal area due to cloud cover > 5% Spatial inconsistency Natural vegetation 323 
Number of municipalities excluded per criteria vary across model sample sizes because they rely on data for different time periods, i.e. 2000-2010 and 2004-2013, and have slight variations in 
model covariates. The reported number of municipalities excluded are based on a sequential exclusion. According to criteria 1.1, municipalities which merged to form single municipalities within a 
time period were excluded. The additional exclusions in criteria 1.2 for the kilocalorie, protein and natural vegetation models occur because these models include a control variable adjusted to 
municipality borders for year 2000 (the census derived multi-dimensional poverty index), while all other data is adjusted to 2004 municipality borders. Thus all municipalities with border 












Table S11. Two-sided Moran’s I test on ZH-, BF- and PRONAF model residuals show no signs of spatial autocorrelation. 
 
 
Zero Hunger BF PRONAF 
 
Border Distance Border Distance Border Distance 
Model Moran’s I P Moran’s I P Moran’s I P Moran’s I P Moran’s I P Moran’s I P 
CBGPS residuals 
Kcalories (per capita) -0.0177 0.051 -0.0057 0.069 -0.0002 0.997 0.0028 0.316 -0.0097 0.289 -0.0078 0.012 
Protein (per capita) -0.0160 0.078 -0.0039 0.221 -0.0002 0.999 0.0033 0.251 -0.0065 0.481 -0.0056 0.076 
Multi-dim. povertyCensus -0.0134 0.135 -0.0023 0.496 -0.0223 0.013 -0.0031 0.340 -0.0088 0.331 -0.0016 0.639 
Multi-dim. povertySIAB 0.0313 0.006 0.0007 0.718 0.0063 0.571 -0.0007 0.861 0.0112 0.323 -0.0021 0.473 
Child MalnutritionSIAB -0.0095 0.439 -0.0048 0.095 -0.0107 0.377 -0.0035 0.236 0.0073 0.523 -0.0061 0.032 
Infant MortalityCensus 0.0006 0.928 -0.0022 0.520 -0.0188 0.047 -0.0083 0.008 -0.0168 0.074 -0.0047 0.158 
Infant MortalitySIAB -0.0167 0.122 -0.0108 0.001 -0.0272 0.011 -0.0103 0.001 0.0037 0.710 -0.0065 0.042 
Natural Veg. (km2) 0.0151 0.088 -0.0005 0.911 -0.0036 0.708 0.0042 0.146 -0.0053 0.570 -0.0049 0.125 
Outcome residuals 
Kcalories (per capita) 0.0210 0.018 0.0070 0.018 0.0180 0.042 0.0064 0.029 0.0194 0.029 0.0067 0.024 
Protein (per capita) -0.0038 0.691 -0.0020 0.553 -0.0069 0.455 -0.0035 0.284 -0.0047 0.615 -0.0002 0.998 
Multi-dim. povertyCensus -0.0129 0.153 -0.0016 0.648 -0.0108 0.232 -0.0006 0.887 -0.0079 0.383 -0.0007 0.856 
Multi-dim. povertySIAB 0.0009 0.920 -0.0009 0.803 0.0015 0.880 0.0005 0.784 0.0004 0.953 -0.0017 0.579 
Child MalnutritionSIAB -0.0070 0.573 -0.0009 0.831 -0.0070 0.538 0.0061 0.010 -0.0034 0.795 -0.0006 0.906 
Infant MortalityCensus -0.0110 0.241 -0.0038 0.250 -0.0005 0.979 -0.0061 0.052 0.0149 0.104 0.0010 0.699 
Infant MortalitySIAB -0.0148 0.172 -0.0036 0.264 -0.0006 0.971 0.0008 0.729 0.0224 0.029 0.0015 0.557 
Natural Veg. (km2) 0.0071 0.415 0.0092 0.002 0.0057 0.513 0.0073 0.013 0.0054 0.534 0.0071 0.016 
Two-sides Moran’s I tests were run on model residuals from the covariate balancing models where CBGPS weights were created (CBGPS residuals) and on residuals from the subsequent CBGPS 
weighted regression models (Outcome residuals). The Moran’s I tests were run twice and based on distinct spatial neighbourhood matrices, i) a neighbourhood matrix based on touching 
municipality borders (labelled Border in the table), and ii) a neighbourhood matrix defined as the inverse distance between each municipality centroid, which was capped at 0.75 of the maximum 
distance (labelled Distance in the table). No signs of spatial autocorrelation were found, as even significant Moran’s I values (P < 0.05, highlighted in bold) have Moran’s I values very close to 0 
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Table S12. A semi-formal test for endogeneity(66) show no signs of endogeneity between the error 
term and ZH-, BF and PRONAF investment variables 
 
 







Kcalories (per capita) 0.005 -0.024 0.008 
Protein (per capita) 0.009 -0.013 0.010 
Multi-dim. poverty (census) -0.003 0.003 -0.001 
Multi-dim. poverty (SIAB) 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Child Malnutrition (SIAB) -0.014 -0.070 -0.066 
Infant Mortality (census) -0.012 -0.080 0.049 
Infant Mortality (SIAB) -0.049 -0.032 -0.085 
Natural Veg. (km2) -0.006 -0.032 -0.006 
The semi-formal test for endogeneity is based on Spearman’s Rho correlations between the error term (model residuals) and 















Fig. S1. Total investment per capita in Brazilian reals (R$) from 2004-2013 for the main Zero Hunger 
sub-programs a Bolsa Familia, b PNAE, c PRONAF and d PAA, available at 
www.dados.gov.br/www.mds.gov.br, showing great spatial variation in investment within and 









Fig. S2. Relative impact of Zero Hunger, Bolsa Familia and PRONAF investment given a spatially 
uniform investment level (column 1-3) on daily per capita kilocalorie production, daily per capita 
protein production, multi-dimensional poverty in the entire population (Census), multi-dimensional 
poverty in the poorer sectors of society (SIAB), child malnutrition in the poorer sectors of society 
(SIAB) and natural vegetation cover (km2) (row 1-6). Relative impact is defined as the relative change 
between outcome given a spatially uniform negligible (1st percentile value) program investment level 
and a spatially uniform median program investment level investment level. Relative impact calculations 
are based on robust multivariable regression models of a covariate-balanced sample (Table 1) that take 
confounding factors into account including interactions between investment and state, or (in the natural 
vegetation cover model) investment and biome. States and biomes with significantly different outcomes 
to the overall effect are indicated by thick black borders; thin black border show region borders (row 1-
5) and ecological biome borders (row 6). We use a normative colour scheme, with blue indicating 
beneficial and red non-beneficial impacts, grey areas signify municipalities not included in the analysis 
because they were urban, or has insufficient data or fall within the model reference state/biome for 





















Fig. S3. High consistency between multi-dimensional poverty (census) (MPI) overall and its three 
dimensions Health, Education and Living Standard for 2000 and 2010 (top 3 rows), and the Brazilian 
Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) (when negatively loaded) and its three dimensions 
Longevity, Education and Income (bottom 3 rows).  The largest discrepancies are found in Education 
as MPI only considers education for children age 7-14 and the MHDI the whole population 
(Spearmans’s rho for education is 0.65 and 0.39, for 2000 and 2010, respectively). The other dimensions 
show great similarities (r = 0.78-0.99). Overall the MPI and MHDI correlate well with r = 0.9 and 0.84 
for 2000 and 2010, respectively   
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Fig. S4. Annual investments in the four main Zero Hunger (ZH) sub-programs Bolsa Familia (BF), 
PRONAF, PNAE and PAA available at www.dados.gov.br/www.mds.gov.br, showing a gradual 
increase in annual investments and predominance of BF and PRONAF to a summed ZH investment. 
Horizontal lines indicate investment values included in the respective 2000-2010 and 2004-2013 





Fig. S5. Great covariate balance achieved following the Covariate balancing generalized propensity 
score (CBGPS) method from Fong et al. (50). Orange circles shows average absolute Pearson 
correlation between the Zero Hunger, Bolsa Familia and PRONAF investment variable and model 
covariates (predictor variables) for all models when CBGPS weights are included in the model. Blue 
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